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WHY UN INSPECTIONS? CORRUPTION,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE RULE OF
LAW
Stuart S. Yeh*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption takes a variety of forms. Significantly, the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) specifies that
corruption includes "the abuse of functions or position, that is, the
performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a
public official in the discharge of his or her functions" as well as
giving any person "an undue advantage" resulting from the abuse by
a public official of his or her influence.1 One hundred seventy-four
nations ratified the UNCAC, signaling their support for this
definition of corruption.2
The persistence of corruption is associated with a culture of
impunity. Individuals who engage in corrupt behavior presumably
do so because they believe that the risk of punishment is low relative
to the reward. This suggests a need to identify what is missing from
the environment surrounding these individuals that leads them to
believe that the risk of punishment is low. If an institutional structure
*

The author is an Associate Professor of Evaluation Studies at the
University of Minnesota. His interests include the development of
international institutions to address corruption and promote the rule of law.
The author gratefully acknowledges permission from SAGE to republish
material from his earlier publication, entitled, Is an International Treaty
Needed to Fight Corruption and the Narco-Insurgency in Mexico?, 22 INT’L
CRIM. JUST. REV. 242, 242–50 (2012).
1
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature
Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter UNCAC].
2
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations
Convention against Corruption
Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 November 2014,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited
June 15, 2015).
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is missing, what is that structure? For example, one type of structure
is a dedicated domestic anticorruption unit. However, while many
countries have created this type of unit, results have been
disappointing.
Section 2 of this article explores the reasons for this failure by
drawing upon the experience of Nigeria's Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC). The analysis suggests that this type of
domestic anticorruption unit can only be successful if it is insulated
from interference by powerful domestic elites who benefit from the
continuation of corruption. Section 3 suggests that a promising
strategy involves implementing the type of bilateral treaty that
established the International Commission against Impunity and
Corruption in Guatemala (CICIG).
This type of institution,
establishing UN inspectors, might provide the type of protection that
is needed by domestic anticorruption units. Section 4 proposes an
international treaty establishing UN inspectors empowered to
investigate allegations of corruption, analyzes prospects for
ratification, examines issues raised by the proposal, and suggests that
the precedent established by the Rome Statute (where 122 nations
previously agreed to permit intrusive criminal investigations)3 offers
reason for optimism. Section 5 concludes that the implementation of
this type of international treaty could have a profound effect on the
culture of impunity that prevails wherever corrupt individuals feel
that the risk of punishment is low.

II. NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES
COMMISSION
The experience of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) is instructive. The EFCC was established in
2002, after the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, with a
mandate to investigate and prosecute a range of financial crimes,
including governmental corruption.4 In 2005, the EFCC investigated
all of the country's thirty-six powerful state governors and asserted
that almost all were corrupt.5 By November 2006, five had been
3
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
4
See Letitia Lawson, The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa,
47 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 73, 83–84 (2009).
5
See id. at 85.
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charged with corruption and were impeached.6 By April 2008, the
EFCC had recovered $5 billion in stolen public funds and secured
250 convictions, including a chief of police, a governor, and a
minister.7
The EFCC's director, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, moved aggressively
to institutionalize the EFCC; he obtained a $5 million grant from the
World Bank, permitting the EFCC to target political corruption at the
highest levels without fear of the financial consequences to his
agency.8 He established international links between the EFCC and
INTERPOL, the United Kingdom's Metropolitan Police, the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Canadian Mounted Police, and
South Africa's Scorpions, extending the EFCC's capacity to
investigate corruption. 9 Through his efforts, a coalition of civic
groups agreed to mobilize 500 lawyers, including twenty-five Senior
Advocates, to support EFCC prosecutions of corrupt officials.10
However, even these dedicated efforts were insufficient to
protect the EFCC. Powerful elites had already begun to strike back.
In August 2007, “Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa announced
that the independent prosecutorial powers granted to the EFCC . . .
were unconstitutional, and that all future prosecutions would need to
be vetted by his office.”11 This blocked the EFCC's prosecution of
former Governors Joshua Dariye and Orji Uzor Kalu.12 In December
2007, the EFCC arrested former Governors Ayodele Fayose and
James Ibori, a well-connected, powerful supporter of President Yar'
Adua.13 The government quickly struck back by announcing that the
EFCC, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and
the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) would merge, followed by a
second announcement that Ribadu had been reassigned to attend a
one-year policy and strategic studies course in central Nigeria. 14

6

Id.
Id. at 91.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 90.
10
Id. at 91.
11
Id. at 87.
12
Id. at 88.
13
Fayose, Ibori Sent to Prison, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200712180033.html.
14
Abdullahi Yahaya Bello, Nigeria: EFCC/ICPC/CCB - One Merger,
Many Questions, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 22, 2007),
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712220006.html?page=1; Kingsley Omonobi
7
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Within a year, Ribadu was demoted along with 139 other police
officers, then dismissed and driven into exile.15 An EFCC official
told Human Rights Watch that these moves were intended to
undermine “the independence of the EFCC and halt the investigation
and prosecution of former governors.”16
The case of Nigeria's EFCC illustrates how domestic
anticorruption units are neutralized by powerful elites who benefit
from the continuation of corruption and seek to thwart domestic
anticorruption agencies. However, this case suggests that these units
can be very effective if they are insulated from interference. Is it
possible for the international community to install an institution that
would provide such insulation?

III. GUATEMALA'S CICIG
A promising approach involves the type of bilateral treaty
between the United Nations and Guatemala that established the
CICIG. 17 This treaty authorized the creation of a body of
international, UN-supported inspectors to lead criminal investigations
in Guatemala.18 The rationale is that domestic agencies, weakened
by corruption, are no match for powerful criminal organizations.19
Guatemala has experienced high levels of corruption and
violence. 20 For example, in 2007, Vice President Eduardo Stein
& Emmanuel Ulayi, Nigeria: EFCC - Okiro Confirms Ribadu's Exit,
ALLAFRICA (Dec. 27, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200712280320.html.
15
Misbahu Bashir, Nigeria: Ribadu Demoted – With 139 Others –
Doubts Over His NIPSS Course, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 6, 2008),
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200808060176.html.
16
Nigeria: Firing of Anti-Corruption Chief Would Boost Abusive Politicians,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2, 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2008/01/01/nigeria-firing-anti-corruption-chiefwould-boost-abusive-politicians.
17
See Agreement between the United Nations and Guatemala on the
Establishment of an International Commission against Corruption in
Guatemala (CICIG), Dec. 12, 2006, 2472 U.N.T.S. 47 [hereinafter CICIG];
Patrick Gavigan, Organized Crime, Illicit Power Structures and Guatemala’s
Threatened Peace Process, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 62, 62 (2009); About
CICIG, INT’L COMM’N AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUAT.,
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=about (last visitited June 15, 2015).
18
See About CICIG, supra note 17.
19
Gavigan, supra note 17, at 70.
20
Id.
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conceded that organized crime cartels had gained effective control of
six of Guatemala's twenty-two departments.21 According to Human
Rights Watch, "Guatemala's weak and corrupt law enforcement
institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful
organized crime groups and criminal gangs that contribute to one of
the highest violent crime rates in the Americas . . . . [I]mpunity
remains the norm . . . ."22 Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs
operate death squads and employ violence and intimidation,
supporting their activities through drug trafficking.23 Guatemalan
law enforcement institutions are unable to address this rampant
violence due to intimidation, corruption, and infiltration of the police
and judiciary by the criminal organizations.24 In one notorious case,
three members of the Central American Parliament were killed by
senior members of Guatemala’s police force, including the head of
the organized crime unit. 25 Leadership and pressure from
Guatemalan and international human rights groups, pressure exerted
by the UN to monitor and verify Guatemala's commitments to the
1994 Human Rights Accord, and political calculations by Presidents
Alfonso Portillo and Óscar Berger, led Guatemala and the UN to
create the CICIG via a treaty-level bilateral agreement.26 The CICIG
seeks to address the infiltration of government institutions by
criminal organizations and the operation of violent death squads
operating beyond the control of the Guatemalan state.27 The CICIG
is the first instance of a UN investigative body whose jurisdiction
focuses on corruption and organized crime, rather than human rights
21

Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY – GUATEMALA 1 (2011),
available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/guatemala_0.pdf.
23
See Andrew Hudson & Alexandra W. Taylor, The International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: A New Model for International
Criminal Justice Mechanisms, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 53, 57 (2010).
24
Id. at 56.
25
Id. at 57.
26
See Matthew Kennis, The Creation of the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala: Miscalculation by a ‘Corporate Mafia
State’?, PEACE & CONFLICT MONITOR,
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=918 (last updated
June 6, 2012).
27
See generally Mandate, CICIG,
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate (last visited June 15, 2015)
(describing the main objectives of CICIG’s mandate).
22
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violations.28
The CICIG employs international and local staff members to
conduct independent investigations and produce reports that are
submitted to Guatemalan prosecutors.29 The agreement with the UN
specifies:
The Government of Guatemala shall provide
CICIG with all the assistance necessary for the
discharge of its functions and activities . . . and
shall ensure, in particular, that its members enjoy:
(a) freedom of movement without restriction
throughout Guatemalan territory;
(b) freedom of access without restriction to all
State locations . . . without prior notice . . . ;
(c) freedom to meet and interview any
individual . . . whose testimony is deemed
necessary for the discharge of its mandate;
(d) free access to information and documentary
material that has a bearing on its investigations . . .
whether civilian or military.30
Furthermore, "The Government of Guatemala shall take such
effective and adequate measures as may be required to ensure the
security and protection of [CICIG personnel] . . . . International
personnel shall enjoy . . . immunity from personal arrest or
detention." 31 CICIG investigators have extraordinarily broad
freedom to conduct independent investigations into any person,
official, or entity, and to present criminal charges to Guatemala’s
Public Prosecutor. 32 However, the CICIG is not empowered to
enforce cooperation or impose penalties for noncompliance.33
The CICIG’s activities during its first four years suggest that this
type of international investigative body can quickly achieve success,
despite having limited enforcement tools and no independent ability
to prosecute. The CICIG's investigations led to the indictment of
28

Id.
See CICIG, supra note 17, at 50–51.
30
Id. at 53.
31
Id. at 54–55.
32
See id. at 52–53.
33
See generally id. at 50–56 (lacking specificity on potential penalties
for failure to cooperate with the CICIG).
29
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powerful individuals including ex-President Alfonso Portillo for
corruption; ex-Defence Minister Eduardo Arévalo Lacs for
corruption; Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus for obstruction of justice
and destruction of evidence; General Enrique Ríos Sosa, son of
former Guatemalan General Efrain Rios Montt, and five other exmilitary officials for embezzlement; the kidnappers of Gladys
Monterroso, wife of the Human Rights Ombudsman; and four
members of the National Civilian Police who engaged in extortion
and assault.34 “In all eight cases, the accused [were] directly and
visibly connected to government institutions, politicians[,] or drugtrafficking organizations.”35
When Judge Irma Leticia Valenzuela issued a ruling that
protected ex-President Portillo, the CICIG appealed to Guatemala's
Supreme Court, forcing Judge Valenzuela to resign from the case.36
The CICIG also forced multiple resignations of public prosecutors
34
See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 66–67. Rios Montt was
found guilty and sentenced to eighty years in prison for genocide and crimes
against humanity. Emi McLean, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court
Overturns Rios Montt Conviction and Sends Trial Back to April 19, INT’L
JUSTICE MONITOR (May 21, 2013),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/constitutional-court-overturns-rios-monttconviction-and-sends-trial-back-to-april-19/. The Constitutional Court
overturned the decision, sending the trial back to the lower courts. Id.
Portillo was “acquitted despite damning evidence against him” but later
extradited to the United States “to face charges of money laundering, fraud[,]
and embezzlement of public funds.” James Bargent, Last Rites for
Guatemala’s Anti-Impunity Crusaders CICIG?, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 6,
2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/last-rites-for-guatemalasanti-impunity-warriors. An initial two-year mandate was established by the
agreement between the United Nations and the government of Guatemala,
and was renewed in April 2009 and January 2011. United Nations, Dept. of
Political Affairs, CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala),
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/americ
as/cicig (last visited June 15, 2015). “Its current mandate runs through
[September 4,] 2015.” Id. The current Guatemalan President, Otto Perez
Molina, has announced that he will not extend CICIG's mandate when it
expires in September 2015. Geoffrey Ramsey, Guatemala’s Supreme Court
Judges Take the Bench, THE PAN-AM. POST (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:41 AM),
http://www.thepanamericanpost.com/2014/11/guatemalas-supreme-courtjudges-take.html.
35
Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 65.
36
See id. at 69.
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for corruption or obstruction of justice, including Attorney General
Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and
Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta.37 The CICIG's
investigations also led to a purge of 1,700 allegedly corrupt police
officers.38 These results suggest that the CICIG is having an impact
despite its inability to discipline or prosecute individuals, and despite
the risk of violence to its investigators. Accordingly, the CICIG’s
success suggests that this type of investigative body can be
successful even under conditions where criminal gangs, death squads,
and powerful individuals appear to operate with impunity—
conditions that characterize many developing countries.
Lessons from the CICIG’s experience include the need to
dedicate significant resources to witness and staff security.39 Unless
witnesses and victims feel sufficiently protected, they are unlikely to
provide crucial information and the necessary cooperation for a
successful investigation. Consequently, the CICIG created a witness
protection program by negotiating an agreement with Spain for the
relocation of protected witnesses, training forty-eight police officers
to create an elite group of agents responsible for protecting witnesses,
and successfully pressuring Guatemala to implement legislative
reforms enhancing identity protection for witnesses in organized
crime cases.40
Despite these challenges, the CICIG suggests a way forward that
has not previously been explored. Had Nigeria established a
comparable agreement with the UN, Ribadu potentially could have
filed a complaint with UN investigators, leading to an investigation
of his demotion and dismissal as acts that fall within the UN
definition of corruption because they were intended to protect corrupt
government officials. 41 The mere threat of investigation and
prosecution for corruption might have deterred Attorney General
Michael Aondoakaa from acting in a way that blocked the EFCC's
prosecution of former Governors Joshua Dariye and Orji Uzor Kalu,
and might have deterred government officials from demoting and
37

Id.
Id.
39
See Witness Protection: A Necessary Tool in Justice Administration,
CICIG (Sep. 27, 2011), http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=004620110927E.
40
Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 64.
41
See Stuart S. Yeh, Why UN Inspections? The Accountability Gap in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 7 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 19 (2013).
38
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dismissing Ribadu. 42 Under the international treaty proposed in
Section 4, below, UN investigators would have likely determined that
these actions involved obstruction of justice—crimes subject to
prosecution and punishment under Nigeria's laws.43 Having made
that determination, and after referral of the case to domestic
prosecutors, Aondoakaa and his corrupt colleagues would have faced
a legitimate risk of punishment.
At a minimum, public
condemnation might have forced Aondoakaa's resignation in the
same way that the CICIG forced the resignations of public
prosecutors in Guatemala for corruption or obstruction of justice.44
The experiences of Guatemala suggest that it is feasible to
implement an international treaty that involves intrusive criminal
investigations led by UN investigators even in a country where the
rule of law is extremely weak, where powerful and violent criminal
cartels have gained control of several government departments,
where impunity prevails, and where the prospects for implementing
an international treaty are less than favorable.
Guatemala's
experience also provides reason to believe that barriers to the
implementation of a treaty establishing UN investigators can be
42

See Lawson, supra note 4, at 88.
UN investigators would be more likely than domestic investigators to
act vigorously. While Ribadu could have filed a complaint with Nigeria's
Public Complaints Commission (PCC) or the Independent Corrupt Practices
Commission (ICPC), it is unlikely that these agencies would have requested
charges against the Attorney General because all prosecutions are handled by
the Attorney General. See id. at 81. In contrast, an independent UN
investigation and report that referred charges to Nigeria's public prosecutor
would force the prosecutor to either prosecute or risk public outrage over a
clear failure to prosecute an egregious case of corruption and risk being
forced to resign in the same way that the CICIG forced the resignations of
public prosecutors in Guatemala for corruption or obstruction of justice,
including Attorney General Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro
Matus, and Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta. See, e.g.,
Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 69–70. The proposed international
treaty contains provisions to ensure that the tactics employed by Aondoakaa
could not be used in the future without risking prosecution for obstruction of
justice. The proposed treaty defines the crime of obstruction of justice,
defines a procedure whereby UN inspectors may request an opinion from a
domestic justice, and defines a process whereby reports of obstruction would
be published online by Transparency International in a way that would
publicly identify individuals accused of obstructing justice and would expose
these individuals to the court of public opinion.
44
See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 69.
43
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overcome through the leadership of international and domestic
human rights organizations, pressure exerted by the World Bank, the
IMF, and other nations, as well as realist political calculations by
domestic leaders that the political benefits outweigh the political
costs.

IV. AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY
A promising strategy for fighting corruption involves the
implementation of a multilateral treaty similar to the treaty that
established the CICIG.45 Instituting a treaty that would establish UN
inspectors empowered to investigate allegations of corruption might
provide the type of protection needed by domestic anticorruption
units from interference by powerful elites who benefit from the
continuation of corruption. The proposed treaty would require
signatory parties to establish a system of courts and prosecutors
dedicated to the adjudication and swift resolution of corruption
charges. These dedicated courts would be funded by the UN and
would include checks and balances to ensure they are only served by
honest, competent justices and prosecutors. The dedicated courts
would prioritize charges submitted by UN inspectors and would
ensure the swift resolution of resulting cases. The appendix to this
article contains a summary of the proposed treaty provisions.
However, the proposal also raises numerous issues. For example,
it might be argued that Nigeria would never ratify the type of
agreement that established the CICIG. This argument presumes: (a)
conditions for ratifying this type of agreement were more favorable
in Guatemala than in Nigeria; (b) the influence of reform-oriented
elements of society is stronger in Guatemala than in Nigeria; and (c)
the rule of law is stronger in Guatemala than in Nigeria. However,
the violent circumstances within Guatemala suggest that conditions
for ratification were not more favorable.46 Instead, it may be argued
that the creation of the EFCC and its apparent successes in
investigating all thirty-six of Nigeria's governors, indicting five
45

See Stuart S. Yeh, Ending Corruption in Africa through United
Nations Inspections, 87 INT’L AFF. 629, 639 (2011); Stuart S. Yeh, Is an
International Treaty Needed to Fight Corruption and the Narco-Insurgency
in Mexico?, 22 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 233, 235, 242 (2012); Yeh, Why UN
Inspections? The Accountability Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 41,
at 7.
46
See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 56–57.
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governors for corruption, recovering $5 billion in stolen public funds,
and securing 250 convictions, including a chief of police and a
governor, are evidence that the rule of law in Nigeria is stronger than
that of Guatemala.47 Thus, it appears that conditions in Nigeria are
more, rather than less, favorable for the ratification of the same type
of agreement that established the CICIG.
Significantly, Nigeria has ratified both the UNCAC48 and the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
(AUCPCC).49 Both are international laws committing the parties to
create and enforce domestic laws against corruption, and to extend
cooperation in investigating and prosecuting corruption. 50 These
ratifications suggest that Nigeria might also ratify an international
agreement similar to the CICIG.51
While it might be argued that the CICIG goes far beyond the
UNCAC and the AUCPCC by permitting intrusive inspections by
UN inspectors, Nigeria has also ratified the Rome Statute, which
established the International Criminal Court (ICC) and permits
intrusive inspections similar to the CICIG. 52 The Rome Statute
created an international body of criminal investigators endowed with
broad powers to conduct independent investigations on domestic soil,
similar to the investigations permitted by the CICIG.53 The primary
47

See Lawson, supra note 4, at 91.
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations
Convention against Corruption
Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 November 2014, supra note 2.
49
See Kolawole Olaniyan, Introductory Note to African Union (AU):
Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 1, 1 (2004).
See also African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, Aug. 5, 2006, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter AUCPCC].
50
See CICIG, supra note 1, at 55–57; AUCPCC, supra note 49, at 5–6.
51
I am not suggesting that there are not differences between Nigeria and
Guatemala. However, there is a striking similarity among all states where
the rule of law is weak: they are characterized by high rates of violent deaths,
glaring impunity, corruption, the inability of the state to handle crime, public
outrage, and demands for reform. See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at
69; Chinedum Odenyi, The Domestic Implementation of International
Treaties in Nigeria, NIGERIAN COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT
(July 23, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.ncicc.org.ng/index.php/latest/83-thedomestic-implementation-of-international-treaties-in-nigeria. It is not
unreasonable to think that independent investigators who offer a real hope
for action would be welcomed in any state where these conditions exist.
52
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 115–26.
53
Id.
48
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difference is that the Rome Statute focuses on crimes of war,
aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity,54 whereas UN
inspectors would focus on corruption. However, crimes of war,
aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity also involve
abuse of functions or position by public officials, and thus constitute
an extreme form of corruption.55 The Rome Statute compels every
citizen of a party to the treaty, including the president and powerful
elites, to submit to independent investigators who have the powers of
arrest, detention, trial, and conviction through the ICC.56 Thus, the
Rome Statute establishes a precedent of surrendering domestic
sovereignty in cases where government officials place themselves
above the law.
Importantly, it was not necessary to rely on voluntary
acquiescence by leaders to achieve adherence to the Rome Statute:
pressure from constituents and the international community forced
those leaders to sign the treaty or risk removal at the next election.57
The key to this breakthrough was that the Rome Statute created a
public litmus test of a leader’s willingness to sign an international
treaty establishing the ICC. Leaders evidently found that the
pressure to sign was greater than any concerns they had about the
challenge to their power and domestic sovereignty. 58 The same
process by which the Rome Statute was established provides a model
for establishing a UN inspectorate, involving a similar public litmus
test. The UN General Assembly established a committee that drafted
the ICC Statute, which was subsequently ratified by 123 nations.59
The same process could be pursued to establish a UN inspectorate.
While it might be argued that international inspectors would be
viewed as an unwanted intrusion into domestic affairs, international
treaties are by definition voluntary agreements.60 Only voluntary
54

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 91.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
56
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 92.
57
See Chinedum Odenyi, The Domestic Implementation of International
Treaties in Nigeria, supra note 51.
58
See Yeh, Is an International Treaty Needed to Fight Corruption and
the Narco-Insurgency in Mexico?, supra note 45, at 246.
59
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited June 15, 2015).
60
United Nations Treaty Collection, Definitions of Key Terms Used in
the UN Treaty Collection,
55
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nations would accede to such a treaty.
Pressure from the
international community might expedite passage, but no leader would
sign a treaty, and no parliament would ratify a treaty without the
support of their constituents. Significantly, public opinion polls
indicate that Africans have grown tired of failed promises from
domestic authorities claiming they will address corruption, and are
ready to embrace the type of international intervention represented by
the ICC.61 For example, 61% of Kenyans prefer ICC trials while
only 8% prefer to have domestic courts deal with the perpetrators of
the post-2007 election-related violence. 62 This evidence suggests
that Africans may prefer international criminal inspectors for the
same reasons that Kenyans prefer ICC trials: they might be
persuaded that the only realistic hope to establish accountability is
international inspectors who are beyond the government's influence.
They want more international intervention, not less.63 Thus, leaders
may be forced by public opinion to sign a protocol that would expand
the scope of the UNCAC to permit investigations, led by UN
inspectors, of alleged acts of corruption committed by public
officials.64 The reasons that leaders would sign such a protocol are
the same reasons that previous leaders signed the UNCAC: public
outrage regarding corruption and pressure to create laws and
institutions that restrict it.65 There is nothing unusual about political
leaders signing laws that restrict their own powers: every existing
law restricting power must necessarily have been signed into law by

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_
en.xml#treaties (last visited June 15, 2015).
61
See Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, The Big Fish Won't
Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in
Kenya, 111 AFR. AFF. 244, 245 (2012).
62
Id at 257.
63
In 2007, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua invited British police
experts to "re-invent" Nigeria's police force. See Abegunde Babalola, Power
of Police to Prosecute Criminal Cases: Nigeria and International
Perspectives, 2 EUR. J. BUS. & SOC. SCI. 127, 138 (2014). Nigeria's Inspector
General of Police, Mike Okiro, endorsed this invitation and expressed strong
support: "The British police need to repackage, retrain and give the Nigerian
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previous leaders, albeit in response to pressure from their
constituents.
The broad adoption by 123 nations of a treaty permitting
intrusive inspections suggests that there is reason to believe that a
similar agreement to establish UN inspectors might be ratified by
many nations where levels of corruption are high and the rule of law
is weak. The list of parties to the Rome Statute includes many
nations that rank poorly on Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI).66 Despite high levels of corruption and
weak rule of law, these nations ratified a treaty permitting intrusive
inspections and agreed to execute arrest warrants for all citizens
charged by the ICC prosecutor. 67 Significantly, autocracies with
weak rule of law were at least as likely to ratify the ICC statute as
high rule of law countries.68 Thus, governments that were arguably
at the highest risk of ICC action were most likely to ratify the Rome
Statute. Therefore, there is reason to think many of these nations
may also agree to permit UN inspections and may agree to execute
warrants for the arrest of citizens who are charged with corruption.
Significantly, 174 nations are parties to the UNCAC,69 and thirty-five
African nations have ratified the AUCPCC, 70 evidencing broad
acceptance of international laws designed to fight corruption.

66
These countries include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bangladesh,
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt,
Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mexico,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Timor-Leste, Uganda, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia. Corruption
Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ (last visited June 15, 2015). See
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note
59.
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Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 103.
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International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 252 (2010) ("[T]he least
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The reasons why the least accountable governments were most
likely to ratify the Rome Statute are worth exploring in more detail.
Simmons and Danner suggest that in weak rule of law countries,
internal conflicts are rife, rebel groups unleash attacks, government
forces retaliate, violence abounds, and many parties suffer, including
the party in power as well as opposition parties.71 Thus, there may be
bipartisan support and strong motivation to ratify a treaty that binds
all parties in a way that reduces the risk of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, even at the cost of giving up traditional
sovereign rights regarding the prosecution of individuals accused of
those crimes. In other words, the perceived benefits of ratification
for both the governing and opposing parties may exceed the costs. In
addition, once the treaty is ratified, the threat of prosecution for those
crimes becomes very real, causing all parties to restrain themselves
out of fear of prosecution. Similarly, there may be bipartisan support
for an anticorruption protocol if multiple parties believe that their
rivals are corrupt and need to be restrained. Once a protocol is
ratified, the threat of prosecution would become real, causing all
parties to restrain themselves.
While it might be argued that even if this type of agreement were
ratified, domestic authorities would resist cooperation with UN
inspectors and would resist the execution of arrest warrants for
domestic officials; any nation that ratifies the proposed treaty would
voluntarily accede to the requirement to cooperate and to execute
arrest warrants. 72 The proposed treaty specifies procedures that
require the cooperation of domestic authorities, including the
cooperation of local police in executing arrest warrants, and specifies
penalties for instances of noncooperation (see appendix).73 Once the
treaty is ratified, these provisions would bind all domestic authorities.
The proposed treaty includes built-in provisions for monitoring
domestic compliance with the terms of the treaty. 74 The treaty
71
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note 45, at 245.
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specifies that the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice would appoint one or more entities to monitor compliance,
including national human rights institutions or any other entities
deemed by the Commission to be duly qualified to monitor
compliance. State parties would agree to give designated monitors
access to all reports and information necessary to formulate an
opinion regarding the degree of compliance, including information
deemed relevant by UN inspectors. Refusal by domestic authorities
to provide access to requested reports and information would
constitute a failure of cooperation and an obstruction of justice.
Designated monitors would possess standing to bring suit in domestic
courts to compel the production of relevant reports and information.
Monitors would publish regular reports regarding compliance, and
Transparency International would publish these reports online. The
reports would be admissible as evidence in administrative or judicial
proceedings in the same way and under the same conditions as
administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors.
It might be argued that ratification would be purely symbolic and
would not affect behavior; however, the available evidence does not
support this conclusion. Ratification of the Rome Statute influenced
behavior: the least democratic governments were almost eight times
more likely to terminate a violent conflict if they had ratified the ICC
statute, apparently because of the real threat of prosecution for war
crimes.75 Thus, "the idea that ratification is purely symbolic does not
square with the facts."76 Ratification was not a symbolic action by
leaders who could presume they would be unaffected.77
While it might be argued that domestic authorities lack the
capacity and willingness to execute arrest warrants, domestic
authorities have already demonstrated a basic level of capacity and
willingness. In Nigeria, 250 individuals have been convicted of
economic and financial crimes, including a chief of police and a

International Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE,
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 93
(Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds., 2012); Richard Carver, National
Human Rights Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 181 (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds.,
2012).
75
Simmons & Danner, supra note 68, at 247–48.
76
Id. at 253.
77
See id. at 227.
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governor.78 In 2013, the annual conviction rate accelerated to 117
individuals per year.79 Even in one of the most corrupt nations in the
world, it is possible to obtain convictions. The issue is how to
improve the rate of prosecution and conviction in every state so that
corrupt individuals cannot act with impunity. In every state where
the rule of law is weak, the introduction of independent investigators,
with the capacity to illuminate corrupt police, prosecutors, and
justices, would potentially plug leaks in the judicial system that occur
when corrupt police, prosecutors, and justices believe they can
engage in corruption without being discovered and tried in the court
of public opinion.
With regard to the Rome Statute, the ICC has been effective in
conducting successful investigations, indicting alleged criminals for
committing mass atrocities, executing arrest warrants with the
assistance of domestic authorities, and bringing suspects to trial. The
ICC’s success demonstrates that it is not a paper tiger, and adoption
and ratification are not empty gestures by politicians to placate the
international community. The ICC is bringing criminals to justice in
cases covering Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Darfur/Sudan, and the Central African Republic. 80 The Court
convicted Thomas Lubanga, the founder of the United Congolese
Patriots, of war crimes including kidnapping and forcing children to
participate in armed conflict. 81 The Court convicted Germain
Katanga, former leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri, of
war crimes and crimes against humanity.82 The Court is currently
trying Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, former Vice President, and one of
the richest men in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for war
crimes and crimes against humanity.83 The ICC is also currently
trying Joseph Kony, the Ugandan head of the rebel Lord’s Resistance
Army, for crimes including murder, abduction, mutilation, sexual
78
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enslavement of women and children, and the conscription of child
soldiers.84 Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the first sitting head
of state to face ICC charges, has been indicted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Darfur.85 Laurent Gbagbo, the former
President of Côte d’Ivoire, was indicted and arrested for crimes
against humanity and is currently facing trial. 86 The evidence
suggests that international investigators can be effective and can
obtain the cooperation and assistance of domestic authorities in
executing arrest warrants, even in nations characterized by high
corruption and weak rule of law.
However, it might be argued that, irrespective of treaty
provisions requiring cooperation with UN inspectors and regardless
of the success of the ICC, UN inspectors would not possess the
legitimacy and capacity necessary to enforce the execution of
domestic arrest warrants. What prevents local police from refusing
to cooperate?
UN inspectors would not be completely powerless. They could
obtain and present an arrest warrant to the local police and request
their assistance in its execution. Under the proposed treaty, if local
police attempt to delay or refuse to cooperate when presented with a
valid warrant, they would be subject to investigation and arrest by
UN inspectors for obstruction of justice—specifically, the failure to
execute a valid arrest warrant. There would be real consequences.
For example, Nigeria's criminal code makes the failure to execute a
valid arrest warrant a felony: "Any person who conspires with
another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is
guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for seven years."87
Thus, the failure to execute a valid arrest warrant would be an act of
corruption, as it is an "abuse of functions" involving a "failure to
perform an act" that is required of domestic police when presented
with a valid arrest warrant.88 Furthermore, the Nigerian Police Code
of Conduct requires cooperation with, for example, UN inspectors in
the event that Nigeria ratifies the proposed treaty: "Police officers
will cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
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representatives in the pursuit of justice."89 The Code of Conduct
instructs Nigerian police to cooperate with legally authorized
inspectors.90 This Code, in combination with the requirement in the
proposed treaty to cooperate with UN inspectors and to provide any
assistance needed to execute warrants for arrest, would obligate local
police to assist in executing valid arrest warrants. UN inspectors
would obtain and present a warrant to arrest the corrupt police and
would seek the assistance of honest, competent police to execute the
warrant.91 Even in the most corrupt nations in the world, there are
many honest, competent police officers, as demonstrated by the 250
arrests and convictions obtained by the EFCC in Nigeria.92 The
conviction of a chief of police and a governor suggest that powerful
individuals are not immune to arrest and prosecution.93 The threat of
arrest for obstruction of justice would be a powerful deterrent to any
local police. Furthermore, the police would know that UN inspectors
could not be bribed or corrupted in the same way as their corrupt
domestic counterparts. The danger of arrest and conviction would be
real.
Since the UN would pay inspectors and their careers would
depend on the propriety of their investigations, they could not be
manipulated or pressured in the same way that police or investigators
from a domestic anticorruption unit could be manipulated and
pressured. Unlike domestic police and domestic members of
anticorruption units, UN inspectors would be insulated from the
power exerted by domestic authorities over jobs and careers. As a
result, UN inspectors could not be subjected to the same pressure to
tip-off suspects, tip-off local police, or give corrupt officials
opportunities to make arrangements with local officials to obstruct
investigations and arrests. UN inspectors would arrive unannounced,
giving corrupt officials no time to react. When presented with an
arrest warrant, the local police would have the choice of either
89
Code of Conduct and Professional Standards for Police Officers,
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE, http://npf.gov.ng/code-of-conduct (last visited June
15, 2015).
90
Id.
91
While certain justices might be corrupt and might refuse to issue an
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justices.
92
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cooperating with UN inspectors and executing the warrant, or
obstructing the investigation in the hope that corrupt protectors
would quash any attempt by UN inspectors to execute arrests for
obstruction of justice. But when there is a real threat of arrest for
obstructing justice, even corrupt police would likely decide that
cooperation with UN inspectors is the wisest course of action.
The same logic applies across the entire system of criminal
justice. It might be argued that corrupt prosecutors and judges would
block investigations by UN inspectors, perhaps by releasing suspects,
refusing to prosecute, refusing to hear a case, delaying judgment, or
manipulating the outcome of a case. Under the proposed treaty,
however, those prosecutors and judges would be subject to
investigation by UN inspectors for corruption and obstruction of
justice. The UNCAC defines corruption to include "the abuse of
functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform
an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his
or her functions," as well as giving any person "an undue advantage"
resulting from the abuse by a public official of his or her influence.94
The proposed treaty defines the crime of obstruction of justice, a
procedure whereby UN inspectors may request an opinion from a
domestic judge, and a process whereby reports of obstruction would
be published online by Transparency International in a way that
would publicly identify individuals accused of obstructing justice,
and would expose these individuals to the court of public opinion.
Under the proposed treaty, any attempt to delay or thwart the
effort of a UN inspector to obtain or execute a warrant for arrest, in
excess of the discretionary authority of the judge who receives the
request for a warrant, would constitute an obstruction of justice. Any
attempt to delay or thwart the lawful prosecution, trial, disciplinary
hearing, or oversight hearing of an individual accused of corruption
or obstruction of justice, in excess of the discretionary authority of
the prosecutor, judge, disciplinary body, or oversight agency
exercising jurisdiction over the relevant case, would constitute an
obstruction of justice. A prosecution, trial, disciplinary hearing, or
oversight hearing regarding an individual accused of corruption or
obstruction of justice that is substantially irregular, violates accepted
prosecutorial, judicial, disciplinary, or oversight norms and practices,
and perverts the course of justice, would constitute an obstruction of
justice.
These actions would also trigger new UN investigations. Since
94
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opinions about what falls within the discretion of a prosecutor, judge,
or disciplinary body may differ, the proposed treaty specifies that UN
inspectors may seek a judicial opinion from a domestic judge
regarding an allegation of an obstruction of justice. Domestic judges
are in the best position to formulate a judgment about whether a
prosecutor or judge exceeded his or her discretionary authority.
Since these judges are familiar with domestic norms and practices,
they are unlikely to censure a prosecutor or fellow judge without
compelling evidence that corruption or obstruction of justice has
occurred. The provision for obtaining judicial opinions is intended to
respect domestic norms and places judgments about criminality in the
hands of individuals who are constitutionally vested with the role of
deciding criminality.
The proposed treaty specifies that UN inspectors would submit
reports to be published online by Transparency International. This
provision is analogous to the unsealing of an indictment by a U.S.
prosecutor. The intent of this provision is to illuminate corruption
and obstruction of justice in a way that would be maximally
embarrassing and very difficult to ignore, while still preserving the
legitimate discretionary authority of honest prosecutors and judges.
The treaty seeks to maintain that authority while addressing gross
abuses engineered by powerful domestic elites that currently exploit
countries where the rule of law is weak and impunity abounds.
It is likely that UN reports would receive attention from the
media, especially if they include judicial opinions that an obstruction
of justice has occurred. The adverse publicity would be difficult to
ignore. UN inspectors would recommend charges to the appropriate
prosecuting authorities or disciplinary agencies, and those agencies
would, under the proposed treaty, enforce sanctions in accordance
with agency practices and domestic law. These provisions are
intended to ensure that any prosecutor or judge who attempts to
obstruct justice would be forced from office in the same way that the
CICIG forced the resignations of public prosecutors in Guatemala for
corruption, including Attorney General Juan Luis Florido, Senior
Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and Administrative Crimes Prosecutor
Patricia Lainfiesta.95
Nigeria offers case examples illustrating how this could be
accomplished. In February 2014, Nigeria's National Judicial Council
(NJC) forced two high court judges to retire, reprimanded an appeals
court justice and two high court justices, and issued warning letters to
95
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two high court justices for various acts of corruption, gross
misconduct, and low productivity.96 The process employed by the
NJC suggests how accountability over corrupt justices may be
enforced when justices attempt to manipulate outcomes. In particular,
these cases suggest the process that may be employed to suppress any
temptation to thwart investigations by UN inspectors.
The NJC is comprised of the following:
(a) the Chief Justice of Nigeria . . . [;] (b) . . .
[a] senior Justice of the Supreme Court . . . ;
(c) the President of the Court of Appeal; (d)
five retired Justices selected by the Chief
Justice . . . ; (e) the Chief Judge of the
Federal High Court; (f) five Chief Judges of
States . . . ; (g) one Grand Kadi . . . from the
Sharia Courts of Appeal . . . ; (h) [the]
President of the Customary Court of
Appeal . . . ; (i) five
members
of
the
Nigerian Bar Association . . . [; and]
. . . . (j) two persons [who are not] legal
practitioners.97
The Council is constitutionally vested with the responsibility of
exercising disciplinary control over Nigeria's judicial officers and
recommending the removal of officers for misconduct or poor
performance.98 An eight-member committee of judges evaluates the
performance of judicial officers, while a five-member committee of

96
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judges formulates recommendations regarding disciplinary actions.99
Any individual, including a UN inspector, may file a complaint
against any judge, triggering a hearing and possible disciplinary
sanctions.100
The Council ordered Federal High Court Justice Gladys Olotu to
retire after delaying judgment for eighteen months in a case that
consumed a total of seven years, in violation of constitutional
provisions that require judgment within a period of ninety days.101
The NJC found that Justice Olotu "forgot" to deliver a ruling.102 In a
second case, she failed to deliver a judgment twice, and in a third
case, was guilty of reopening a matter in the absence of legal
authority to do so.103 Investigative reports by the EFCC revealed that
she possessed assets exceeding NGN 2 billion (equivalent to
$12,388,000 USD) that were almost certainly obtained through

99
Committees, NAT’L JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
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100
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corruption.104 Similarly, the NJC ordered Federal High Court Justice
U.A. Inyang to retire after finding that he had engaged in numerous
deliberate, irregular, prejudicial actions.105 The NJC issued letters of
reprimand to Presiding Appeals Court Justice Dalhatu Adamu, High
Court Justice A. A. Adeleye, and High Court Justice D. O.
Amaechina for misconduct and poor performance. 106 The NJC
previously issued a reprimand to Federal High Court Justice
Okechukwu Okeke, forcing his retirement. 107 In 2013, they
suspended Federal Justice Abubakar Talba for twelve months
without pay because of an investigation into his role in a police
pension case involving John Yusuf, an Assistant Director in the
Police Pension Office.108 Justice Talba had engineered a reduction in
the charges against Yusuf and a concomitant reduction in the
associated recommended sentence of fourteen years to two years of
jail time; Talba then gave Yusuf the option of paying a fine of NGN
250,000 ($1,549 USD) for each charge instead of imprisonment.109
The egregious nature of the complaints against these justices led
several members of the Nigerian legal profession to call for criminal
prosecutions.110
The preceding examples from Nigeria suggest that UN
investigations and referrals to disciplinary bodies such as the NJC
would have real consequences for corrupt justices. Even in one of
the most corrupt nations in the world, immoral justices are not
immune to public opinion. A UN investigation and referral to a
disciplinary body could trigger suspension, an order to retire, or
forced retirement as a consequence of pressure exerted by the stain of
a letter of reprimand.111 The stain of a UN investigation and a charge
of corruption—especially a charge that is sustained by a judicial
opinion—would be difficult to ignore and would undermine the
legitimacy of a corrupt prosecutor or judge, causing erosion of public
104
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support. Without public support, corrupt prosecutors and judges may
be forced from office, even in the most corrupt nations in the world.
When faced with a real threat of vigorous investigation by
independent investigators who are perceived to be incorruptible, even
corrupt police, prosecutors, and judges may decide that virtuous
behavior is the wisest course of action.

IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence from Guatemala and Nigeria suggests that UN
investigations and referrals to disciplinary bodies could trigger the
removal of corrupt prosecutors, judges, and government officials.
They are not immune to public condemnation, and can only survive
if their crimes are hidden from public view. UN inspectors would
serve to pull back the veil and expose corruption for the world to see.
UN inspectors who act independently of the ethnic, tribal, and class
rivalries endemic to Nigeria and other nations may possess a level of
legitimacy not possessed by domestic police and domestic
anticorruption units.
The proposed treaty seeks to multiply the power of public
opinion by including a provision specifying that periodic updates
regarding the progress of each case would be posted by Transparency
International on a publicly accessible website. Thus, any individual
with access to the Internet could check the progress of cases as they
meander through the domestic court system. While Internet access is
limited, as of December 2014, over 297 million Africans now have
access, including most journalists in major African cities.112 When
printed, their stories are widely accessible to the public. In addition,
citizen journalists, using mobile phones with Internet access, are
“emerging as a powerful phenomenon across Africa.” 113
Furthermore, significant news, including news about corrupt elites, is
disseminated orally.114 Through these channels, and despite limited
Internet access, the online publication of UN investigative reports
112
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would ensure that efforts to thwart justice would become widely
known. The referral of charges regarding corruption or obstruction
of justice to disciplinary bodies such as the NJC would likely trigger
letters of reprimand, inflame public opinion, and create intense
pressure to resign. This process may force the resignations of
powerful individuals in the same way that the CICIG forced Attorney
General Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and
Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta,115 and the NJC
forced Federal High Court Justice Okechukwu Okeke to resign.116
While it may seem unlikely that mere investigations can stop
corruption, this is exactly what happened in Hong Kong. The Hong
Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) did not
have the power to convict, sentence, or imprison suspects, yet it was
very successful in halting corruption.117 Until the advent of the
ICAC, Hong Kong’s police force was notoriously corrupt. 118
However, the introduction of the ICAC ensured for the first time that
no corrupt police officer could feel safe from exposure.119 There
would be no tip-off of a raid, inspection, or investigation, and no
chance to hide or destroy evidence. The calculus of the benefits and
costs of corruption changed dramatically.120
In the same way, independent UN investigators could ensure that
corrupt police, prosecutors, judges, legislators, and staff of
anticorruption units never feel safe from exposure. By exposing
every member of the law enforcement community, prosecutor, judge,
legislator, and investigator in an anticorruption unit to the threat of
115
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investigation, independent investigators deter corruption in the very
institutions that normally fight it. Police are compelled to collect
evidence, prosecutors are compelled to present evidence, judges are
compelled to cite evidence, and legislators are compelled to
investigate evidence of corruption, or risk investigation and
prosecution themselves for favoritism and corruption. When faced
with the prospect of incarceration or removal, it becomes much easier
for potentially corrupt police, prosecutors, judges, and legislators to
decline bribes and to behave ethically. At the same time, it becomes
easier for honest police, prosecutors, judges, and legislators to
advance themselves through competent work.
By deterring
corruption and crime among crime fighters, independent
investigators multiply the effectiveness of their own efforts to fight
crime and restore the powers of the police, judiciary, and
anticorruption units.
The experience of the ICAC suggests that the presence of
independent investigators has a powerful effect on corrupt officials
across all branches of government.121 When officials know that their
telephones may be tapped, that any meeting might be recorded, and
that any colleague may provide evidence to prosecutors, the potential
for corruption is drastically reduced. However, this is only the case
when there is a truly independent body composed of inspectors that
are perceived to be incorruptible. This is what is needed, but has yet
to be established by the international community.
The proposal to create a body of UN inspectors may be
distinguished from the many failed attempts to create anticorruption
units modeled after the ICAC. The difference is that UN inspectors
would be protected from the ability of domestic ruling elites to
manipulate the jobs and careers of domestic investigators. UN
inspectors could not be removed in the same way that Mallam Nuhu
Ribadu, the director of Nigeria's EFCC, was removed. 122 UN
inspectors would have the authority to investigate any instances
where corrupt police, prosecutors, or judges attempted to obstruct
justice. This would include the authority to obtain and execute arrest
warrants for corrupt police and the ability to aggressively investigate
corrupt prosecutors and judges. This capacity would distinguish UN
inspectors from the limited capacity of domestic anticorruption units
that can be easily manipulated and thwarted by powerful ruling elites.
121
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The proposal for an international treaty, modeled on the treaty
authorizing the CICIG, was presented at the Symposium on
Institutional Capacity, Corruption, and Development sponsored by
the Rule of Law Collaborative on April 11, 2014, at the University of
South Carolina School of Law. The spirited discussion at the
symposium suggested the need to write this article. While space
does not permit the author to address all of the issues posed by the
treaty, numerous issues have previously been addressed in articles
published in International Affairs,123 the International Public Policy
Review, 124 the International Criminal Justice Review, 125 and the
Journal of African Policy Studies.126 The interested reader is urged
to read those articles, begin a serious examination of the proposed
treaty, and consider the possibility that UN inspectors could have a
profound effect on the culture of impunity that prevails wherever
corrupt individuals feel the risk of punishment is low.
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APPENDIX
A draft protocol to the UNCAC, originally drafted to establish an
African Commission Against Corruption (ACAC) and intended to
deter corruption in African countries, could be broadly adapted for a
protocol that would apply to signatories worldwide. Upon entry into
force, the treaty would empower the UN to create an ICAC to
investigate allegations of corruption. The preamble justifies the
protocol by citing Articles 3, 10, 13, 43, 46, 48, and 62 of the
UNCAC. Article 62 of the UNCAC provides the legal basis for
employing the resources of the UN, and Articles 3, 10, 13, 43, 46, 48,
and 62 provide the legal basis to augment the capabilities of the
police, law enforcement, and anticorruption agencies in developing
countries to combat corruption. Furthermore, the UNCAC provides
the legal authority for law enforcement personnel of member states to
act on behalf of the law enforcement personnel of a requesting state.
Specifically, Article 46 of the UNCAC specifies that parties "shall
afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in
investigations, prosecutions[,] and judicial proceedings" in relation to
corruption-related offenses.127 Finally, Article 62 of the UNCAC
created a mechanism that could be used to fund the proposed ICAC
through contributions by the World Bank, IMF, parties to the
UNCAC, and the G8 countries, which have already agreed to commit
substantial financial resources to fight corruption and ensure
accountability and government effectiveness.
Thus, legal authority and a funding mechanism have already
been established that would permit: (a) the establishment of a UNfunded ICAC; (b) the use of ICAC inspectors to augment the
capabilities of the police, law enforcement, and anticorruption
agencies in developing countries; and (c) the employment of
inspectors and law enforcement personnel of member states, through
the ICAC, to act on behalf of the law enforcement personnel of a
requesting state to conduct investigations, involving all of the powers
enumerated in Article 46, listed above. What is needed is not legal
authority, but rather a UN protocol that spells out the details of how
this would work in practice. Thus, the draft proposal is framed as a
protocol that supplements the UNCAC.
The draft protocol specifies procedures. Any individual may
submit an allegation of corruption. After receiving a request for an
127
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investigation, the ICAC, under the auspices of the UN Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, would prioritize and
review the merits of each request. The Commission would designate
a UN inspector who would lead and supervise every aspect of the
investigation, ensuring that the investigation is conducted in a
manner that respects and abides by the laws and law enforcement
procedures of the state where the investigation is conducted.
Inspectors, their staff, and their surrogates would be immune from
arrest or detention, and their papers, documents, and personal
baggage would enjoy the inviolability accorded to diplomatic envoys
in conformity with Article VI of the United Nations Convention on
Privileges and Immunities.
However, an operations review
committee would monitor their conduct and the propriety of all
investigations, with members nominated by parties to the protocol.
The operations review committee would refer cases of criminal
misconduct by inspectors or their surrogates for prosecution under
the laws and judicial system of the state where the inspectors or
surrogates maintain citizenship.
UN inspectors would exercise their powers through production
of a written authorization showing their identity and position,
together with documentation indicating the subject matter and
purpose of the on-the-spot check, inspection, or investigation.
Individuals served with these documents would be required to
comply under the same terms as would be required by the police, law
enforcement, and anticorruption units of the state where the
investigation is conducted. Failure to comply would have the same
consequences as failure to comply with investigations by the police,
law enforcement, and anticorruption units of the state where the
investigation is conducted.
Where witnesses or suspects resist an on-the-spot check,
inspection, interview, or investigation, the police, law enforcement,
and anticorruption units of the state where the investigation is
conducted, acting in accordance with national rules, would give UN
inspectors assistance as needed to allow them to discharge their duty
in carrying out an on-the-spot check, inspection, interview, or
investigation. It would be for the police, law enforcement, and
anticorruption units of the state where the investigation is conducted
to take any necessary measures, in conformity with national law, to
enforce cooperation. In cases where an inspector believes that
adequate and timely assistance has not been provided by the requisite
police, law enforcement, judicial, and anti-corruption units, the
inspector may file a request for censure by the Commission on Crime
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Prevention and Criminal Justice. The Commission would review the
request and may subpoena evidence or interview witnesses. The
Commission would make a determination, by a majority vote, to
approve or disapprove the motion for censure no later than twentyone days after receiving a request for censure.
Under the draft protocol, The World Bank and the IMF would
develop and implement a system of reducing aid and credits in
response to the magnitude and frequency of noncooperation with UN
inspectors and their surrogates. Parties to the protocol agree to abide
by the judgment of the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice with regard to the magnitude and frequency of any
noncooperation, and with regard to the Commission’s
recommendations for implementing reforms of the police, law
enforcement, judicial, and anticorruption units of the state where the
investigation is conducted.
Under the draft protocol, inspectors would hand over disposition
of each case to the appropriate prosecuting authority upon
completion of the investigation. Each inspector would submit reports
to the Commission every thirty days following assignment to an
investigation until the investigation is completed and the case is
handed over to the appropriate prosecuting authority. When the case
is handed over to the prosecuting authority, copies of the final report
would be submitted to Transparency International, in addition to the
relevant prosecuting authorities, to ensure that the reports are not
ignored through the machinations of corrupt officials. Transparency
International would publish updates regarding the disposition of the
case every thirty days, until the appropriate prosecuting authority or
court dismisses the case, or the appropriate court reaches a final
verdict.
The reports and all supporting documents would constitute
admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the
member state in which their use proves necessary, in the same way
and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by
national administrative inspectors. They would be subject to the
same evaluation rules as those applicable to administrative reports
drawn up by national administrative inspectors and would be of
identical value to such reports.
Under the draft protocol, parties to the treaty would establish a
system of courts and prosecutors dedicated to the adjudication and
swift resolution of charges of corruption. The Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice would ensure that dedicated courts
and prosecutors have regular and adequate funding to perform their
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responsibilities, would conduct periodic reviews to evaluate the
performance of dedicated courts and prosecutors, and would redirect
funding based upon these evaluations. Dedicated courts and
prosecutors would prioritize charges submitted by UN inspectors or
their surrogates, would ensure the swift resolution of resulting cases,
and would not tolerate delays that pervert the course of justice.
Under the draft protocol, parties to the treaty would establish
national judicial councils vested with the responsibilities of selecting
justices and prosecutors of the utmost integrity to serve and ensure
adequate staffing of dedicated courts, develop and implement
streamlined adjudication procedures, ensure the swift resolution of
corruption charges, evaluate the performance of justices and
prosecutors, and censure and remove justices and prosecutors whose
performance is substandard. National judicial councils would be
appointed by panels of justices, and prosecutors and would be
composed of justices and prosecutors of the utmost integrity who are
duly qualified to perform the responsibilities enumerated within the
treaty. National judicial councils would submit nominations of
justices, prosecutors, and individuals nominated to serve on national
judicial councils to the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice. The Commission would retain the power, upon a
majority vote, to veto the nomination of any individual to serve on a
national judicial council, veto the nomination of any justice or
prosecutor to serve a dedicated court, and request the censure or
removal of any justice or prosecutor serving a dedicated court whose
performance is alleged to be substandard. The Commission would be
able to consider information provided by any individual as well as
any governmental or nongovernmental body or organization in
formulating its decisions.
To ensure the safety of witnesses, victims, and UN inspectors
under the violent conditions that exist in many developing countries,
the protocol specifies that UN inspectors would determine the
measures necessary to protect their own safety and the safety of
ICAC staff, witnesses, victims, and all individuals who assist with
ICAC investigations. The state where the investigation is conducted
would implement measures requested by UN inspectors and their
surrogates, including the use of armored vehicles, secure buildings,
special plain-clothes guards, and measures to protect their identity.
In addition, it may be necessary to implement witness protection
measures including laws that permit closed trial sessions, the use of
pseudonyms, voice distortion technology to shield the identity of
witnesses while in court, and the use of confidential witness
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interviews. These measures have been employed to protect witnesses
and victims testifying before the ICC and other international
tribunals.128 It may be necessary to negotiate agreements with G8
countries for the relocation of protected witnesses. The necessary
provisions may be written into the protocol or may be established
through separate agreements. While these provisions could not
eliminate the threat of violence, the threat could be managed, as
indicated by the success of Guatemala's CICIG, operating under
similarly violent conditions.
Despite the possibility of intimidation, there is ample precedent from
Guatemala that witnesses and victims are willing to provide
testimony and inspectors are willing to lead investigations, even
under the violent conditions that prevail in Guatemala.
Under the proposed treaty, attempts to arrest, interfere with, or
harm witnesses, victims, or inspectors, contrary to the wishes of UN
inspectors, would constitute obstruction of justice. Any attempt to
delay or thwart the effort of a UN inspector to obtain a warrant for
arrest, or the trial of an individual accused of corruption or
obstruction of justice, and any prosecution or trial of an individual
accused of corruption or obstruction of justice that is substantially
irregular, violates accepted judicial norms and practices, and perverts
the course of justice would constitute obstruction of justice. These
actions would trigger new ICAC investigations. UN inspectors
would submit reports to be published online by Transparency
International. They would recommend charges to the appropriate
prosecuting authorities or disciplinary agencies and those agencies
would, under the proposed treaty, enforce sanctions in accordance
with agency practices and domestic law. The protocol also specifies
that a UN inspector may file a request for censure by the UN
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice if the
inspector believes that obstruction of justice has occurred, or
adequate and timely cooperation, assistance or protection have not
been provided by the requisite police, law enforcement, judicial, anticorruption or government units. The protocol specifies that the
World Bank and IMF would develop and implement a system of
reducing aid and credits in response to the magnitude and frequency
of acts of noncooperation with UN inspectors and their surrogates.
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